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but, is it inconsistent to say that the apparently contingent states of affairs 
are, in reality, only apparent? The counter-intuitiveness of this view does 
not imply that it is wrong. o’Connor did not justify the requirement 
that we should avoid the above-mentioned ‘absurd’ conclusion that 
there are no contingencies. Therefore, his remaining task is to clarify the 
motivation for seeking the middle way.
In what sense is the necessary being necessary? ordinarily, modalities 
are analyzed in terms of quantifications over worlds. o’Connor himself 
mentions this analysis (p. 70). However, it is not obvious that the neces-
sity of o’Connor’s necessary being can be explained in the ordinary 
way, because the necessary being is not immanent to any world, but 
transcendent. Probably, the modal status of an entity can only be analyzed 
in the possible-world framework when the entity exists inside the worlds. 
Therefore, I believe that o’Connor cannot say that the necessary being 
is necessary because it exists in every world. Perhaps o’Connor might 
realize this subtle point because, with regard to the necessary being, he 
says that it ‘exists necessarily a se (of itself, rather than having its necessity 
rest in connection to something else that necessarily exists)’ (p. 128). 
However, he does not give a more detailed analysis on the notion of ‘a se 
necessity’. Therefore, a consideration concerning the modal status of the 
necessary being itself might be needed.
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Personal Identity and Resurrection offers thoughtful and critical solutions 
to the problem of personal survival after somatic death. The authors, who 
participated in the university of Innsbruck 2008 summer conference, 
rigorously engage in ways to make sense of the conjunction of both 
personal identity and persistence from somatic death, the possible 
intermediate state, and the physical resurrection. Yet it offers more than 
a  defense of survival in Christian philosophy of religion and moves 
beyond the foundations to construct theology. Thus, a careful, yet dense, 
treatment contributes to the discussion and provides many avenues 
worthy of further research.
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A brief summary is in order. Stephen T. Davis offers an intriguing 
account of personal identity in the resurrection by arguing for the Divine 
will as a  necessary and essential property of a  person’s identity in the 
resurrection. Persistence, on this account, requires a  person’s intrinsic 
properties plus Divine sustenance. one might be inclined to think 
edwards has come back from the dead because of the similarity Davis 
has with an edwardsian metaphysic of persons. Davis begins his essay by 
laying the groundwork of God’s conservation of the world, the problems 
associated with personal identity, the traditional conception of the 
resurrection, and contemporary problems associated with it. Davis ends 
by responding to objections raised against his model. In this section, 
Davis responds to van Inwagen’s objection from immanent causation by 
suggesting that the causal chain passes through the mind of God. His 
explanation of this defense is terse and has an arbitrary feel. Is it that 
the body is real when it exists, yet when it dies it still exists in the mind 
of God? Confusingly, Davis argues that persistence of identity requires 
one’s intrinsic properties plus Divine conservation but it seems plain that 
the body does not exist; and by extension, a future body is not causally 
connected to the former body. other questions emerge that deserve 
attention. Can the body be a real object that is later co-assimilated into 
the mind of God as an idea that is made real again at a later point? With 
all of its virtues, Davis’s solution is a bit perplexing.
Chapters 2, 3, and 5 seem to build on a discussion that emerged from 
van Inwagen’s body-snatching model of the resurrection. In chapter 2, 
Zimmerman supplies an alternative solution to the body-snatching 
model with his falling elevator model. later bodies are causally connected 
to their original bodies through an in-built pattern. A  “budding” 
mechanism in the dead body gives rise to a  later existing body. one 
intriguing contribution this model provides is its development of an 
emergent substance dualist position. emergent substance dualism, made 
famous by William Hasker, says that properties of a conscious sort give 
rise to a person, but it is difficult to see how upon somatic death that 
person would persist given its supervenience upon the bodily organism. 
Zimmerman’s model presents one possible explanation. It also has the 
virtues of positing a  robust and morally coherent theological story 
contrasted with the deceptive body-snatching model. Apart from the 
virtues, it encounters multiple problems from closest continuer, the 
problem from duplication, and the problem from momentum-like 
properties. In chapter 3, eric olson argues based on the irreversibility 
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principle that three solutions remain for personal survival from somatic 
death: body snatching, immaterialism or a Divine-command model with 
a  4D ontology. In chapter 5, Hud Hudson responds to the Animalist 
charge of a  material organism’s inability to survive somatic death. 
Hudson argues for a  perdurantist conception of persons as satisfying 
the requirements for survival. I tend to agree that Hudson’s solution is 
superior to other materialist alternatives.
Godehard brüntrup, in chapter 4, explores a mediating view between 
3D conceptions of persons and 4D conceptions of persons. Interestingly, 
he argues that 3D conceptions are irreducible to 4D conceptions, but 
that process ontology with gen-identity accounts for realist ontology of 
events, yet also presumes an idealist ontology of subjects that perdure in 
a similar fashion as found in stage theory.
Chapters 6 and 7 offer attractive constructions of persons by drawing 
from analytic thought and fusing it with what is often associated 
with continental thought. In chapter 6, Thomas Schärtl disputes the 
likelihood of the reassembly view, but argues instead for a phenomenal 
self-surviving somatic death without the original body. The question 
emerging, in the reader’s mind, from his discussion is what in fact is 
surviving? Johannes Haag, in chapter 7, argues for a transcendental ‘I’ 
similar to that of Immanuel Kant.
The next set of chapters, from 8-11, center on hylomorphism or 
Constitutionalism or both. In chapter 8, Niederbacher reflects on 
disparate statements found in Thomas’s hylomorphism and concludes 
that Thomas is working with two understandings of physical matter – 
one is prime matter and informed matter. With this ontology, Aquinas is 
able to account for the persistence of bodies from death to resurrection. 
In chapter 9, baker argues for a constitution view of the resurrection, 
which has the attending benefit of a unified natural world. In chapter 
10, Quitterer demonstrates the similarities between hylomorphism and 
the constitution view and argues that hylomorphism has the advantage 
of construing the soul as inclusive of mental and bodily predicates. 
Kevin Corcoran, in chapter 11, argues that a constitution view does not 
contradict a healthy relational self, but in fact provides the ontological 
ground for a relational self.
The final chapters give a helpful constructive treatment of theological 
and scientific issues. In chapter 12, Christian Tapp explains ratzinger’s 
view on the resurrection. In chapter 13, Wandinger re-considers the 
logic of purgatory and the possibility of universal salvation. Finally, in 
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chapter 14, russell assembles various positions on the conjunction of 
eschatology and cosmology by considering both their continuity and 
discontinuity.
The contributions are numerous, and, as such, I will limit myself to three 
movements in relation to the contemporary philosophical/theological 
literature. First, the book contributes by carrying the discussion forward 
on materialism and the resurrection. The synthesis of recent materialist 
understandings of the resurrection makes for a  useful synopsis in one 
volume. Particularly helpful is Hudson’s five rejoinders to the threat of 
Animalism. As noted earlier, if one considers emergent substance dualism 
as a form of materialism then Zimmerman takes it one-step forward in 
offering a natural design plan for survival. Furthermore, the constitution 
view as a  form of materialism receives ample treatment. baker offers 
a clear account of the constitution view of the resurrection where persons 
just are identical with first-person perspectives constituted by their body. 
In lieu of this, persons can persist from death to resurrection, but this 
requires a Divine miracle whereby God recreates the body (pp. 168-169). 
The difficulty that is not mentioned is the notion that a  first-person 
perspective is identical with the person, which seems to presuppose 
a distinct substance. on the constitution view the first-person perspective 
is an impure relation/property to the body, thus it cannot be a substance 
– arguably. relative properties require some sort of substance for the 
first-person perspective to exist, thus either the first-person-perspective 
supervenes on the bodily organism or there is another substance account-
ing for first-person perspective – i.e. a new entity.
Secondly, the respective ontologies emphasizing either relation or 
substance are wisely considered. Theologically, a  treatment of persons 
must consider objective and subjective matters that pertain to persons 
as dynamically interacting with reality. The reader will be introduced to 
this in Davis’s discussion of the Divine will as a constituent of the person. 
more explicitly, brüntrup S.J. offers an ontology that construes the 
objective and subjective as intimates in contrast to a Cartesian ontology, 
whereby on brüntrup’s view the subjective is rooted in an objective 
ontology of events. Creatively, both Schärtl and Haag seek to bring the 
objective and subjective closer when considering the brute nature of 
phenomenal selves. Haag seems to assume a transcendental version of 
substance dualism. Corcoran’s essay offers another contribution to the 
discussion where he distinguishes between metaphysically necessary 
conditions and causal necessary requirements. Persons have necessary 
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conditions for being a certain kind of thing, but are also social beings that 
emerge by causal necessity. Corcoran argues that substance ontology has 
a kind of priority, yet not at the exclusion of a robust relational ontology. 
Finally, Christian Tapp’s discussion on the resurrection exemplifies both 
objective and subjective truths when attempting to integrate them with 
a communitarian and dialogical understanding of persons.
The third movement worthy of highlighting is the constructive 
developments concerning personal eschatology. Nikolaus Wandinger 
utilizes a traditional notion of purgatory, yet moves beyond some of its 
original dualistic assumptions. Contrasted with the traditional model, 
this model states that purgatory is purification for those who are 
heaven-bound, which he argues assumes that persons are necessarily 
embodied. robert John russell also exemplifies a movement by pressing 
on the bounds of scientific and theological discourse by considering 
the resurrection in relation to eschatology and cosmology. Inspired by 
Polkinghorne’s thought on Jesus’ resurrection, russell argues that the new 
earth will be transformed yet be continuous with the old earth. russell 
does not fail to mention this is in keeping the general sentiment of most 
contemporary theologians (p. 244). The most fascinating constructive 
addition is found in russell’s building upon the notion of eschatology 
as prolepsis, from Pannenberg, and diagrammatically displaying what 
it might look like for there to be both continuity and discontinuity, the 
notion that the future results appear in the present and persist from that 
moment forward (p. 256).
With the book’s many contributory benefits, there are three criticisms 
worth mentioning. The first criticism is from the non-existent interaction 
with anti-realist or idealist views of physical matter. There does seem 
to be historical precedent in the likes of berkeley, malebranche and 
edwards – to name a few. Given the nature of the book’s emergence from 
a conference, this may be expecting too much, but it would be nice to 
interact with the subject in a more balanced manner.
There are two criticisms that flow out of a predominant tendency in 
the book. First, is the tendency toward non-reductive materialism as 
presupposed fact (p. 11). Surprisingly, while the reader may expect to 
see these assumptions in other philosophical disciplines – one does not 
expect to see this in a text of such a theological nature. A second, related 
criticism is the tendency to deny substance dualism outright as a viable 
option worthy of consideration, which the reader will recognize based 
upon a quick perusal of the contents. Ted Peters supports this bias in 
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the foreword, when stating, “The non-dualist alternative explored in the 
pages that follow is the resurrection of the body (XII).” Neither Cartesian 
nor non-Cartesian versions of substance dualism find their way into the 
discussion. This dismissal is intimately tied to the perennial problem 
concerning bodily persistence faced in the book.
Gasser in commenting on the views represented in the book, states: 
“No solution is able to preserve identity in the strict sense (p. 9).” If no 
view provides this kind of identity and personal identity depends upon 
a body that is strictly the same, then the materialist will have difficulty 
accounting for personal identity, as well, because for most versions of 
materialism personal identity is predicated upon same body/brain. 
Alternative solutions that are able to account for persistence of personal 
identity and, possibly bodily identity, include a form of immaterialism, 
substance dualism or Thomistic hylomorphism with the soul/form having 
ens per se kind of existence. both of these views account for personal 
identity by affirming an immaterial entity endures through somatic death 
to the physical resurrection. Nonetheless, how might they account for 
the body? one answer may be that an enduring soul only needs a similar 
body, or, alternatively, the soul provides the sufficient conditions for the 
new body. In the final analysis, it is clear that to dismiss dualist views of 
persons is unwarranted. unpopular though it may be, substance dualism 
has something to contribute to the contemporary discussion.
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The title of a recent biography of David Hume is The Great Infidel and 
almost all interpreters of Hume, from his contemporaries on, have 
taken him to be an atheist, agnostic or some kind of deist. In Hume’s 
works, though, there are many instances of what Timothy Yoder calls 
‘affirmation passages’ where Hume seems to acknowledge the existence of 
the traditional God of theism. These are usually written off as mere irony 
and seen as part of a strategy of concealment for reasons of prudence 
given the dangers of open avowal of atheism in the eighteenth century. 
much of Yoder’s book focuses on these passages and on the purposes 
to which authors put various kinds of irony. He highlights ‘covering 
